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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Crookstons1 failure to controvert the errors 
committed by the trial court in dismissing Rocky Mountain State 
Bank should be viewed as a confession of reversible error. The 
"last minute" dismissal of the bank was both procedurally and 
substantively defective. The dismissal, and the trial court's 
refusal to grant a continuance, severely prejudiced Fire 
Insurance's rights. 
Fire Insurance properly raised its constitutional 
challenges at the trial court. The determination of whether such 
constitutional claims have been raised should be guided by liberal 
principles tending to promote just and fair results. 
This Court should review patently defective jury 
instructions, even though formal objections to those instructions 
were not made at trial. Significant considerations of justice and 
public policy warrant careful review of the defective instructions. 
The trial court further committed error in denying Fire 
Insurance's motion for summary judgment on the Crookstons1 
complaint. The parties' one-year contractual limitation was 
enforceable as a matter of law. The limitation barred all of the 




THE CROOKSTONS CONFESS BOTH SUBSTANTIVE AND 
PROCEDURAL ERRORS IN CONNECTION WITH THE 
TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
STATE BANK. 
The Crookstons' brief fails to controvert Fire Insurance's 
claims that the trial court committed reversible error in granting 
Rocky Mountain State Bank's "last minute" motion for summary judg-
ment on the morning of trial. The Crookstons merely contend that 
Fire Insurance Exchange did not have an "absolute right" to have 
the bank present during the trial, and that there was no error in 
refusing to continue the trial following the granting of the motion 
for summary judgment. The Crookstons' silence on this point 
should be viewed as a confession of error. See, Wickman v. Arizona 
State Board of Osteopathic Examiners, 138 Ariz.App. 337, 674 P.2d 
891, 894 (1983) ("If a debatable issue is raised on appeal, 
appellee's silence constitutes a confession of reversible error.") 
As Fire Insurance Exchange's initial brief demonstrated, 
the trial court committed reversible error in failing to allow 
Fire Insurance adequate time to respond to the bank's motion for 
summary judgment. The bank served its motion for summary judgment 
and memorandum in support thereof on the evening of Friday, May 22, 
1987, the day prior to the start of a three-day Memorial Day 
weekend. On May 26, 1987, just five calendar days and one working 
day later, the trial court granted the bank's motion for summary 
judgment. The ruling came only minutes before trial began in this 
action. The trial court's actions violated both Rule 56(c) of the 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4(d) of the Rules of Practice 
of the Third Judicial District Court. The motion and the hearing 
thereon were objected to by counsel for Fire Insurance. (R. at 
2996-99) The procedural irregularities were also acknowledged by 
counsel for both the Crookstons and the bank. (R. at 2997, 3000-01) 
The trial court's total disregard of controlling rules of 
procedure and practice resulted in the court being less than fully 
informed on the pertinent substantive law of contribution. The 
trial court was told little more than that as a general rule con-
tribution is not permitted between intentional tortfeasors. 
(R. at 2994-3013) However, as demonstrated in Fire Insurance's 
initial brief, at the time of the alleged tortious acts in this 
case, there was contribution among intentional joint tortfeasors 
in the State of Utah. See Appellant's Brief at 100-15 The trial 
court's finding that Fire Insurance had no right of contribution 
against Rocky Mountain State Bank was, therefore, error. The 
Crookstons do not dispute that fact in their brief. The 
Crookstons' silence in this regard constitutes a confession of 
reversible error. 
The Crookstons contend on appeal that the trial court's 
dismissal of Fire Insurance's claim of contribution against the 
bank does not constitute prejudicial error since Fire Insurance 
had no "absolute right to have all potential joint tort-feasors 
joined in an action." Respondents' Brief at 84. The Crookstons 
then cite this Court to Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723 (Utah 1983) 
in support of their contention. Although this Court in Cruz 
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clearly suggests that a right of contribution exists among 
intentional joint tortfeasors, Cruz does not stand for the 
proposition for which it is cited by the Crookstons. Indeed, 
Cruz is distinguishable from the instant case in one essential 
aspect: the defendant in Cruz did not have the other potential 
joint tortfeasors joined in the action. In the instant case, 
Rocky Mountain State Bank was a party until the ill-timed hearing 
moments before the trial began. While there may not be an abso-
lute right to require the presence and participation of other 
potential joint tortfeasors, who for one reason or another are not 
present in the litigation, once potential joint tortfeasors are 
joined, a defendant has a vested right to keep them in the action. 
Since Rocky Mountain State Bank was already a party, 
Fire Insurance had a vested right to require and demand that Rocky 
Mountain State Bank remain present as a party during the course 
of the subsequent trial. 
The Crookstons also contend on appeal that the claims of 
error for the dismissal of the bank on the morning of trial do 
"not negate the jury's finding that Fire Insurance wrongfully 
injured the Crookstons." Respondents' brief at 84. Fire 
Insurance does not contest the fact that the jury returned a 
verdict finding that it had injured the Crookstons. What Fire 
Insurance does contest is the fact that the trial court, in 
improperly dismissing Rocky Mountain State Bank minutes before 
trial, did not permit the same jury to pass judgment on both Fire 
Insurance's actions and the actions of Rocky Mountain State Bank. 
-4-
Fundamental justice requires that where two joint tortfeasors are 
present before the same court that the relative fault and 
culpability of each of those joint tortfeasors be determined by 
the same trier of fact. The trial court's dismissal of Rocky 
Mountain State Bank, in essence, denied Fire Insurance its vested 
right to have the relative fault of two alleged joint tortfeasors 
determined by the same trier of fact. 
The Crookstons likewise contend on appeal that the trial 
court did not commit error in refusing to grant a continuance. 
Respondents' Brief at 85. The Crookstons rhetorically ask: 
"What more would the bank's presence add in Fire Insurance's 
favor?" lei. The Crookstons then boldly pronounce that there is 
no evidence that the trial court acted unreasonably or 
capriciously. As stated previously, the trial court's actions on 
the morning of trial were fundamentally flawed, both procedurally 
and substantively. Fire Insurance went to the courthouse on the 
morning of trial expecting that the Crookstons' claims would be 
refuted by not one, but two parties. Fire Insurance went to the 
courthouse on the morning of trial with every right to expect that 
the comparative fault of each of the alleged joint tortfeasors 
would be determined by the same jury. Once the trial court's 
wholly unexpected and improper actions occurred, Fire Insurance 
promptly moved to continue the trial for a later date. (R. at 
3007) Such a continuance was proper in order for Fire Insurance 
to reexamine its potential claims and theories against the bank, 
as well as to modify its trial strategy due to the fact that Fire 
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Insurance was the sole remaining defendant. The rules of proce-
dure and practice were implemented to prevent trial by ambush. 
Yet, in this case, Fire Insurance was ambushed by a "last minute" 
settlement between the Crookstons and Rocky Mountain State Bank, 
and an ill-timed and improperly-granted motion for summary judg-
ment in favor of the bank on Fire Insurance's cross-claim. To 
say that Fire Insurance was not prejudiced, and that the trial 
court did not act outside reason is to deny the obvious. 
The Crookstons also urge on appeal that this case should 
not be reversed and remanded due to the potential prejudice they 
may sustain as a result of the stay of all proceedings involving 
Rocky Mountain State Bank. Respondent's Brief at 86-87. The 
Crookstons urge this Court to accept the proposition that it is 
acceptable for Fire Insurance to be subject to that stay, but that 
it is unacceptable for the Crookstons also to be subject to the 
stay. The essence of the Crookstons1 argument is that prejudice, 
like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder. 
Reversal and remand is further warranted due to the 
impact the dismissal of the bank had on the trial. Where a ruling 
is substantively incorrect, procedurally incorrect, and affects 
the presentation of evidence at trial, the very essence of 
reversible error is found. The trial judge himself has admitted 
that his ruling affected the trial from which this appeal is 
brought: 
Counsel, I recognize had the dismissal of the 
Bank not occurred, that is, had this Court 
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ruled that there was indeed contribution . . . 
between intentional tortfeasors, the complexion 
of the trial and the issues submitted to the 
jury may well have been different than they are. 
In the Matter of the Possession of Rocky Mountain State Bank, 
C87-5743, Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
Transcript of Motion to Lift Stay, April 8, 1988, at p. 20. 
POINT II. 
FIRE INSURANCE'S CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS ARE 
PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT. 
The Crookstons urge this Court to summarily dispose of 
real and substantial constitutional issues raised by Fire 
Insurance, in the court below and on appeal. Rather than directly 
confront and refute the substantive arguments raised in Fire 
Insurance's initial brief, the Crookstons urge this Court to 
affirm on the ground that the constitutional claims were not 
sufficiently raised at trial. However, a review of the case law 
reveals that an issue may be raised at the trial level in several 
ways. In Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1976), this Court 
held that a party's claims were sufficiently raised in the party's 
pleadings, affidavits and depositions to be preserved on appeal. 
In Rich, the plaintiffs brought suit in fraud seeking rescission 
of their contract to purchase a water softener business. Defen-
dants answered and counterclaimed for the purchase price of the 
business. Defendants filed affidavits in support of their answer, 
which were countered by plaintiffs filing their depositions. Upon 
the basis of the submissions, the trial court granted defendants' 
motion for summary judgment. 
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On appeal, plaintiffs contended that the defendants had 
defrauded them into purchasing the business. Defendants responded, 
claiming that the plaintiffs raised certain matters which were not 
presented to the trial court. This Court, however, found that the 
matters were raised at trial and remanded the case: 
Upon examination we find that, though the 
pleadings and submissions speak in generality, 
the critical matters recited above pertaining 
to the plaintiffs1 claims of fraud were suf-
ficiently set forth in the pleadings, affidavits 
and depositions. 
Our conclusion is that it is necessary to 
remand this case for trial. 
Id. at 1268. 
Likewise, in Mihalcik v. Celotex Corp., 354 Pa.Super. 
163, 511 A.2d 239 (1986), the court held that certain issues had 
been sufficiently raised at trial in order to be considered on 
appeal. In Mihalcik, plaintiffs brought nine separate actions for 
asbestos-related injuries sustained by plaintiffs1 decedents. 
Defendants filed motions for summary judgment, alleging that 
plaintiffs1 claims were barred by the applicable statute of 
limitation. The defendants1 motions were granted. Two of the 
plaintiffs appealed, contending in part that the trial court had 
erred in dismissing their breach of warranty survival claims. 
Defendants argued on appeal that the appellate court should reject 
the plaintiffs' arguments since that issue had not been raised at 
trial. 
In reversing in part and remanding the action back to the 
trial court, the Pennsylvania court held that the issue had been 
-8-
sufficiently raised at the trial level: 
Appellees contend that this issue has been 
raised for the first time on appeal and is 
therefore waived. We disagree. Both 
appellants raised this issue in their memor-
anda of law in opposition to appellees' 
motions for summary judgment. 
Id. at 249, n. 9. 
Similarly, in Massey v. Aztec Life Ins. Co., 532 S.W.2d 
702 (Tex.Civ.App. 1976), the court found that an issue raised in 
deposition testimony could be reviewed on appeal. In Massey, 
plaintiff brought suit against her former employer's health 
insurance provider for certain medical expenses. The insurer had 
denied benefits to the plaintiff on the ground that plaintiff's 
coverage had lapsed and that plaintiff's disability was due to a 
pre-existing condition. The defendant insurer successfully moved 
for summary judgment. 
On appeal, plaintiff claimed that her deposition 
testimony raised certain genuine issues of material fact. 
Defendant objected on the grounds that plaintiff had failed to 
raise the issue at trial. The Texas court reversed and remanded 
the action, finding that the issue was sufficiently raised in the 
deposition in order to be preserved on appeal. 1(3. at 706. 
While it is generally true that an issue may not be 
raised for the first time on appeal, the determination of whether 
an issue has been raised in the court below should be guided by 
liberal principles tending to serve the dictates of justice, 
rather than procedural technicalities. See, Zeman v. Lufthansa 
German Airlines, 699 P.2d 1274, 1280 (Alaska 1985) (Appellate 
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courts should use a liberal approach towards determining whether 
an issue or theory was raised in a lower court proceeding). 
This Court in Pratt v. City of Riverton, 639 P.2d 172, 
173-74 (Utah 1981), noted that issues not raised at trial generally 
cannot be raised on appeal. Pratt recognized an exception "where 
a person's liberty is at stake." id. at 174. While this Court in 
Pratt did not define what liberty interest must be at stake in 
order for the exception to apply, it is clear that Fire Insurance 
has significant liberty interests at stake in this matter. At a 
minimum, Fire Insurance has a right to not have its property, 4,8 
million dollars, taken by unconstitutional means. Numerous courts 
have interpreted liberty to include many of the interests of Fire 
Insurance that are now jeopardized due to an unprecedented award 
of punitive damages. Liberty includes and comprehends all 
personal rights and their enjoyment. Rosenblum v. Rosenblum, 181 
Misc. 78, 42 N.Y.S.2d 626, 630 (1943). Liberty also includes the 
enjoyment and use of one's property. Grosgean v. American Press 
Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936). The term "liberty" must not be 
restricted only to include freedom from arrest or restraint, but 
should include the right to enjoy to the fullest extent the 
privileges and protections given or assured by law, including 
certain property interests. See, McGrew v. Industrial Comm'n, 96 
Utah 203, 85 P.2d 608, 611 (1938); State v. Nuss, 79 S.D. 522, 114 
N.W.2d 633, 635 (1962). 
Other courts have likewise held that a more liberal 
approach should be taken in determining whether to consider 
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constitutional issues on appeal. In Deseret Chrysler-Plymouth, 
Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 600 P.2d 1189 (Nev. 1979), the Nevada 
Supreme Court noted that its common practice of refusing to 
consider issues for the first time on appeal was simply a 
discretional "matter of practice,11 rather than a jurisdictional 
limitation on the court's power. The court then sua sponte raised 
a constitutional issue as the basis for affirming the trial 
court's actions. Id. at 1191. See also, Gosewisch v. American 
Honda Motor Co., 153 Ariz. 400, 737 P.2d 376 (1987) (Questions of 
constitutional guarantees and violations thereof may be considered 
for the first time on appeal); Pettit v. American National Bank, 
649 P.2d 525 (Okla. 1982) (Constitutional due process claims may 
be considered on appeal though not presented to the trial court). 
The Crookstons admit that Fire Insurance raised its con-
stitutional challenges prior to the post-trial motions and hearings 
for new trial and judgment n.o.v. Respondents' Brief at 59. 
However, the Crookstons assert that the issues were not suffi-
ciently raised, i.e., Fire Insurance did not obtain a specific 
ruling as to the merits of their constitutional claim at trial. 
Fire Insurance put its constitutional claims directly at issue in 
its response to plaintiffs' trial memorandum on the issue of 
punitive damages and motion in limine. (R. at 1434-36.) In 
addition to raising the significant constitutional issues in its 
trial memorandum on punitive damages, Fire Insurance also raised 
its constitutional claims in its answer to plaintiffs' second 
amended complaint and its proposed jury instructions. (R. at 
-11-
1027-51, 1389.) 
While Fire Insurance has had the opportunity to refine 
its constitutional claims since the time of trial, parties to an 
appeal are entitled to expand and refine the details of their 
arguments preserved on appeal. Zeman v. Lufthansa German 
Airlines, 699 P.2d 1274, 1280 (Alaska 1985). The issues and 
arguments raised by Fire Insurance on appeal are nothing more 
than a refinement of matters previously raised before the trial 
court. Review of the constitutional claims of Fire Insurance is 
further warranted by the ever-increasing frequency and size of 
punitive damage awards in the State of Utah. See Addendum A-3. 
The Crookstons also suggest that there is no merit to 
Fire Insurance Exchange's constitutional claims due to the United 
States Supreme Court's refusal to grant certiorari to several 
cases involving similar constitutional challenges. However, the 
Crookstons' reliance on denials of certiorari is without 
substance. The United States Supreme Court repeatedly has 
stressed that the denial of certiorari has no precedential effect. 
Justice Frankfurter in State v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 
912, 917-19 (1950), stated as follows: 
The sole significance of such denial of a 
petition for writ of certiorari need not be 
elucidated to those versed in the Court's 
procedures. It simply means that fewer than 
four members of the Court deemed it desirable 
to review a decision of the lower court as a 
matter "of sound judicial discretion." Rule 
38, Para. 5. A variety of considerations 
underlie denials of the writ, and as to the 
same petition different reasons may lead 
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different justices to the same result. This 
is especially true of petitions for review on 
writ of certiorari to a State court. Narrowly 
technical reasons may lead to denials. Review 
may be sought too late; the judgment of the 
lower court may not be final; it may not be 
the judgment of the State court of last resort; 
the decision may be supportable as a matter of 
State law, not subject to review by this Court, 
even though the State court also passed on 
issues of federal law. A decision may satisfy 
all these technical requirements and yet may 
commend itself for review to fewer than four 
members of the Court. Pertinent considerations 
of judicial policy here come into play. A case 
may raise an important question but the record 
may be cloudy. It may be desirable to have 
different aspects of an issue further illuminated 
by the lower courts. Wise adjudication has its 
own time for ripening. 
* * * 
Inasmuch, therefore, as all that a denial of a 
petition for a writ of certiorari means is that 
fewer than four members of the Court thought it 
should be granted, this Court has rigorously 
insisted that such a denial carries with it no 
implication whatever regarding the Court's views 
on the merits of the case which it has declined 
to review. The Court has said this again and 
again; again and again the admonition has to be 
repeated. 
See also, United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 460-61 (1973) 
(Marshall, J. dissenting). 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S PATENTLY DEFECTIVE JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS SHOULD BE REVIEWED. 
The Crookstons contend that the trial court's defective 
jury instructions should not be reviewed on appeal on several 
grounds: (1) that the instructions were not objected to by trial 
counsel for Fire Insurance, (2) that the instructions were 
substantially correct statements of the law, (3) that Fire 
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Insurance sustained no prejudice as a result of the defective 
instructions, and (4) that Fire Insurance has failed to establish 
any "special circumstances" which would merit review of the jury 
instructions on appeal. 
A. Considerations Warranting Review of the 
Defective Instructions. 
Fire Insurance admits that it did not formally make any 
objection at trial to the allegedly defective jury instructions., 
However, this Court's review of those jury instructions is not 
confined to the limited review provided for by Rule 51, U.R.C.P. 
While Rule 51 permits this Court to review jury instructions that 
were not objected to at trial, Rule 59(a), U.R.C.P., also provides 
this Court with ample authority to review patently defective jury 
instructions: 
Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new 
trial may be granted to all or any of the 
parties and on all or part of the issues, 
for any of the following causes . . . . 
(1) irregularity in the proceedings of the 
court, jury, or adverse party, or any 
order of the court, or abuse of discre-
tion by which either party was prevented 
from having a fair trial. 
* * * 
(7) error in law. 
The Colorado Supreme Court in First Security National 
Bank v. Campbell, 198 Colo. 344, 599 P.2d 915 (1979), noted that 
courts are not restricted by the limitations of Rule 51 for the 
review of jury instructions not objected to at trial. In 
Campbell, plaintiff bank commenced the action against defendant on 
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two promissory notes. Defendant answered and counterclaimed 
against plaintiff. The jury returned a verdict for defendant on 
the counterclaim and against the bank on its claim. After the 
bank filed a motion for a new trial, the trial court granted a new 
trial on the ground that the instructions given were erroneous and 
incomplete. The bank's trial counsel did not, however, raise any 
objection at trial to the instructions, did not tender any 
alternative instructions, and did not raise any issue about 
defective instructions in the motion for a new trial. 
Upon retrial, the trial court found for the plaintiff bank. 
The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the outcome of the second 
trial, holding that the trial court had erred in granting a new 
trial since the bank's counsel had failed to properly object to 
the instructions. 
The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals, and affirmed the actions of the trial court, by 
stating: 
The ground for which a new trial may be 
ordered are set forth in Rule 59(a). Such 
grounds are the basis for a new trial both 
upon motion of the parties or by the trial 
court upon its own initiative. It may grant 
a new trial on the basis of any of these 
grounds without the qualification otherwise 
imposed by Rule 51. Of relevance is C.R.C.P. 
59(a)(1) which provides that a new trial may 
be granted on the basis of "[a]ny irregularity 
in the proceedings by which any party was 
prevented from having a fair trial." In this 
case the trial judge determined that a new 
trial was required to insure that justice was 
served. Whether or not a new trial is granted 
is usually a matter for the sound discretion 
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of the trial judge whose presence and observa-
tion of the trial better equipped him for 
making this decision. Brncic v. Metz, 28 
Colo.App. 204, 471 P.2d 618 (1970). 
We hold that Rule 51 is a restriction upon 
parties, not upon the court. A trial court 
may sua sponte, in the exercise cf its sound 
discretion and in order to accomplish sub-
stantial justice, order a new trial on the 
basis of erroneous or improper jury instructions. 
This rule is subject only to the limitations 
of Rule 59(a) and is not restricted by a 
party's failure to comply with the contem-
poraneous objection requirement of Rule 51. 
Campbell, 599 P.2d at 916-17 (emphasis added). 
Similar concerns moved the United States Supreme Court in 
City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981), to 
vacate and remand an action back to the trial court on the basis 
of defective jury instructions that were not objected to at trial. 
The Court in City of Newport rejected the proposition that it was 
limited to any set standard of review in considering the defective 
nature of jury instructions at trial: 
Nor are we persuaded that our review should 
be limited to determining whether "plain error" 
has been committed, an exception to Rule 51 that 
is invoked on occasion by the Courts of Appeals 
absent timely objection in the trial court. No 
"right" to a specific standard of review exists 
in this setting, any more than a "right" to 
review existed at all once petitioner failed to 
except to the charge at trial. But given the 
special circumstances of this case, limiting our 
review to a restrictive "plain error" standard 
would be peculiarly inapt. 
Id. at 256. 
The Court in City of Newport noted the alleged defective 
instructions impacted important policy considerations surrounding 
the awarding of punitive damages. Rather than avoid the question 
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on the availability of punitive damages against a municipality, due 
to the city's failure to object to the suspect jury instruction, 
the United States Supreme Court reviewed the defective instruction: 
We undertake review here in order to resolve 
one element of the uncertainty, that is, the 
availability of punitive damages, and it would 
scarcely be appropriate or just to confine any 
review to determining whether any error that 
might exist as sufficiently egregious to qualify 
under Rule 51. The very novelty of the legal 
issue at stake counsels unrestricted review. 
In addition to being novel, the punitive damages 
question is important and appears likely to 
recur in Section 1983 litigation against munici-
palities. And here the question was squarely 
presented and decided on a complete trial record 
by the court of first resort, was argued by both 
sides to the Court of Appeals, and has been fully 
briefed before this Court. In light of all these 
factors, we conclude that restricting our review 
to the plain-error standard which served neither 
to promote the interests of justice nor to 
advance efficient judicial administration. 
Id. at 257. 
This Court's review, likewise, of the claimed errors in 
the jury instructions should not be limited due to Fire 
Insurance's failure to object to the instructions at trial. The 
Rules of Procedure, both appellate and civil, are designed to pro-
mote and insure the interests of justice. The United States 
Supreme Court has stated that courts should be hesitant to 
interpret rules of practice and procedure in such a way as to 
diminish the likelihood of a fair and just result occurring: 
Rules of practice and procedure are designed 
to promote the ends of justice, not to defeat 
them. A rigid and undeviating judicially 
declared practice under which courts of review 
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would invariably and under all circumstances 
decline to consider all questions which had not 
previously been specifically urged would be out 
of harmony with this policy. Orderly rules of 
procedure do not require sacrifice of the rules 
of fundamental justice. 
Hormel v. Helverinq, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1940) 
The Crookstons suggest that they should be permitted to 
prevail on appeal on the technical and rigid application of Rule 
51, U.R.C.P. The Crookstons ignore the effect this case may have 
on other cases and litigants. This case is not a "garden variety" 
piece of litigation. This case involves an unprecedented award of 
punitive damages in the State of Utah. The ramifications of this 
case will be felt far and wide. Under such circumstances, this 
Court should note the concerns raised by the court in Wirtz v. 
International Harvester, 331 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1964). In Wirtz, 
plaintiffs brought a fair labor standards action against their 
employer for alleged unpaid overtime compensation. The jury 
returned a verdict in favor of the defendant employer. Plaintiffs 
appealed, asserting that the jury instructions were in error. The 
plaintiffs did not, however, challenge the jury instructions at 
trial. 
In reversing and remanding the trial court's actions on 
the basis of defective instructions, the Fifth Circuit noted that 
the outcome of the trial had broad repercussions and established 
dangerous precedent. The court noted with concern: 
This litigation is not, of course, a private 
contest. It is litigation touching upon the 
proper application of the Wage and Hour law 
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which has a broad public purpose independent 
of the rights of the particular persons who 
appeared as the original plaintiffs in the 
suit below. Other employees of this local 
installation may have rights that are affected 
by the proper determination of this case. 
Id. at 465. In view of the broad interests involved in this case, 
this Court should freely review the defective jury instructions in 
this case. Fire Insurance respectfully submits that the 
instructions were in error, and that the defects prejudiced Fire 
Insurance's right to a fair and just trial. 
B. Instruction Nos. 28 and 29 Were Defective. 
On appeal, the Crookstons urge this Court to disregard 
the obvious. The trial court's fraud instruction, Instruction 
No. 28, omitted several critical and essential factors. (R. at 
1509-10) The Crookstons attempt to explain away these defects by 
claiming that the instruction was patterned after a federal jury 
instruction. Respondents' brief at 29. The substantive law of 
fraud is an issue of state law, not federal common law. The trial 
court erred in not patterning instruction No. 28 after the 
explicit standard set forth in Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 
P.2d 273, 274 (1952) . 
The Crookstons likewise attempt to explain away the 
deficiencies in Instruction No. 29 by claiming that the 
circumstances in this case merit a finding that a fiduciary 
relationship existed between Fire Insurance and the Crookstons. 
While Fire Insurance admits that it had a contractual relationship 
with both the Crookstons and Rocky Mountain State Bank that 
relationship did not give rise to a fiduciary relationship or a 
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relationship of trust whereby the Crookstons had a right to 
"heedlessly accept as truth" whatever Fire Insurance stated. This 
Court has clearly delineated the nature of the relationship 
between an insured and its insurer. The relationship is purely 
contractual, rather than fiduciary. Beck v. Farmers Insurance 
Exchange, 701 P-2d 795, 800 (Utah 1984). As a result, the rela-
tionship between Fire Insurance and the Crookstons was for all 
intents and purposes adversarial in nature. Lyon v. Hartford 
Accident and Indemnity Co., 25 Utah 2d 311, 480 P.2d 739, 745 
(1971), overruled on other grounds, 701 P.2d 798 (1985). 
The consideration of the type of relationship that 
existed between Fire Insurance and the Crookstons, and the 
propriety of Jury Instruction No. 29, creating a rebuttable 
presumption of a right to rely in behalf of the Crookstons, must 
be viewed with several factors in mind. First, it is important to 
realize that Fire Insurance also had a first-party contractual 
relationship with the bank. Fire Insurance owed parallel duties 
to both the Crookstons and the bank. This unique tri-party 
relationship was contractual in nature, rather than fiduciary. 
Second, throughout the entire time when the allegedly fraudulent 
representations were made by Fire Insurance, the Crookstons were 
represented by competent counsel, H. Ralph Klemm. Third, although 
Fire Insurance had a contractual relationship with the bank, Fire 
Insurance had no right or ability to control the allegedly 
wrongful foreclosure on the Crookstons' home. In addition, Fire 
Insurance had no ability or right to control the bank's use of the 
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settlement proceeds. The Crookstons1 damages, if any, are not the 
result of any breach of a fiduciary or "quasi fiduciary" duty, but 
rather arise out of the breach of contractual duties based upon 
the express and implied terms and conditions of the insurance pol-
icy issued by Fire Insurance. There is no basis in law or fact 
for holding that there was a fiduciary relationship between Fire 
Insurance and the Crookstons, nor any right on the part of the 
Crookstons to "heedlessly accept as truth" whatever Fire Insurance 
represented to them and their counsel. 
POINT IV. 
THE CROOKSTONS* CLAIMS WERE BARRED UNDER THE 
POLICY'S CONTRACTUAL LIMITATION PROVISION. 
The Crookstons contend on appeal that the trial court 
committed no error in denying Fire Insurance's motion for summary 
judgment based on the policy's one-year limitation period on the 
commencement of actions against Fire Insurance. The pertinent 
policy provision requires: 
No suit or action on this policy for the 
recovery of any claim shall be sustainable 
in any court of law or equity unless all the 
requirements of this policy shall have been 
complied with, and unless commenced within 
12 months next after inception of the loss. 
(R. at 18). Fire Insurance respectfully submits that the trial 
court committed error in denying its motion for summary judgment. 
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A. The Scope of the Policy Limitation is Not 
Restricted to Contract Actions. 
There is strong and persuasive authority that rejects the 
narrow construction given to the policy limitation by the 
Crookstons. Numerous courts have held that such policy provisions 
bar all actions, including tort claims, not brought within the 
limitation period contained in the policy of insurance. In 
Lawrence v. Western Mutual Insurance Co., 204 Cal.3d 565, 251 
Cal.Rptr. 319 (1984), the California court held that a policy 
provision, identical to that presented in this case, applied to 
all claims brought against an insurer. In Lawrence, the plaintiff 
had a home constructed in 1968. In late 1983 or early 1984, a 
portion of the home settled. Plaintiff retained an expert who 
opined that the settlement was due to inadequate compaction of the 
fill dirt upon which the house was built. Plaintiff erroneously 
concluded that the damages caused by the earth movement were 
excluded from coverage under his policy. Plaintiff did not file a 
claim for the loss until July 15, 1985. Defendant denied 
coverage. Plaintiff then filed suit against defendant for breach 
of contract, misrepresentation, and bad faith in January, 1985. 
Defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that the suit 
was barred by the contractual one-year limitation on the filing of 
an action. Defendant's motion was granted. 
On appeal, the plaintiff contended that his claims were 
not "on the policy." The California Court of Appeals rejected the 
plaintiff's argument, and affirmed the lower court's granting of 
summary judgment based upon the contractual limitation, by 
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stating: 
Finally, the one-year commencement of suit 
provision also precludes Lawrence from 
recovery on the cause of action for alleged 
tortious bad faith in handling his claim 
because of purported misrepresentations in 
the policy concerning coverage. Claims 
arising out of the contractual relationship 
are subject to the contractual limitations 
period contained in the insurance policy. 
Lawrence, 251 Cal.Rptr. at 324. See also Abari v. State Farm Fire 
& Casualty Co. , Cal.3d , Cal.Rptr. (1988). 
Georgia courts have likewise held that limitation 
provisions, identical to that at issue in this case, apply to all 
actions and claims against insurers. In Reece v. Massachusetts 
Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 107 Ga.App. 581, 130 S.E.2d 72 
(1963), the court rejected an insured's claim that his action was 
not "on the policy." In Reece, the court stated: 
Plaintiff in error concedes in his brief 
that because of this clause [a one-year 
right to commence action provision] he 
cannot maintain an action for breach of the 
contract. He ingeniously attempts to 
circumvent this disaster by labeling his 
petition as an action ex delicto with the 
expectation that through this means he will 
be able to invoke the usual statutory time 
limitation for bringing tort action . . . . 
However, as we view it, we do not think it 
at all necessary to decide whether the 
petition is ex contractu or ex delicto. It 
makes no difference. In either proceeding 
the valid stipulation of the contract limits 
the time within which the action may be 
sustained to 12 months after the loss. 
Reece, 130 S.E.2d at 785. See also, Modern Carpet Industries, 
Inc. v. Factory Insurance Association, 125 Ga.App. 150, 186 S.E.2d 
586, 587 (1971). 
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The courts of Wisconsin have also rejected the narrow 
construction now urged upon this Court by the Crookstons. In 
Skrupky v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 55 Wise.2d 636, 201 N.W.2d 
49 (1972), the court held that the contractual limitation was 
applicable to the plaintiff!s claims of misrepresentation and 
negligence. Plaintiff brought suit maintaining that defendant emd 
defendant's agents misrepresented the coverage under his policy 
and were negligent in failing to provide full coverage. The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the trial court's refusal to 
grant summary judgment in favor of the defendant. In reaching its 
decision, the court stated: 
[W]hen a loss occurs that is or should have 
been covered by an insurance contract, an 
action or suit to collect must be based upon 
the policy. It is the insurance policy or 
contract that creates the obligation on the 
party of the insurance company to pay the 
loss. 
Skrupky, 201 N.W.2d at 51-2. See also, Martin v. Liberty Mutual 
Fire Insurance Co., 97 Wise.2d 127, 293 N.W.2d 168 (1980). 
B. The One-Year Contractual Limitation Provision 
is Enforceable. 
The Crookstons maintain on appeal that the longer three-
year limitation period provided for under Utah Code Ann. 
§31A-21-313 (Supp. 1986), should govern this case. The Crookstons 
urge that Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-313 (Supp. 1986) should be 
retroactively applied to this case since the statutory provision 
is "procedural" rather than "substantive." While such an argument 
may make sense under other circumstances, a contrary result is 
required in this case. 
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The undisputed facts in this case are that the 
"inception" of the plaintiffs' losses occurred on December 2, 
1981. The governing statute at that time permitted insurers to 
impose one-year limitations periods in their policies. Utah Code 
Ann. §31-19-19 (1953) (repealed 1986). When the plaintiffs filed 
suit in 1983, §31-19-19 was still in effect. All of the critical 
elements surrounding the plaintiffs' claims, including the 
collapse of their home, occurred prior to the enactment of Utah 
Code Ann. §31A-21-313 (Supp. 1986). 
This Court in State Dept. of Social Services v. Higgs, 
656 P.2d 998 (Utah 1982), recognized that even "procedural" 
statutes may not be applied retroactively to "enlarge, eliminate, 
or destroy vested or contractual rights." 1x3. at 1000. Once the 
"inception" of the plaintiffs' loss occurred in December, 1981, 
the interest and rights of the parties under the policy of insur-
ance issued by Fire Insurance vested. Once those rights were 
vested, the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-313 (Supp. 1986) 
may not be applied retroactively to impair the parties' obliga-
tions under that contract. See U.S. Const., Art. I, §10; and Utah 
Const., Art. I, §§1, 7 and 18. 
C. The Crookstons' Claims Were Not Tolled Under 
Either Utah Code Ann. §71-12-40 (1953) or 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-44 (1953). 
The Crookstons also contend that if the one-year policy 
limitation is valid, that their claims are somehow saved under the 
tolling provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§78-12-40 and 78-12-44 
(1953). The Crookstons seek to have this court apply the saving 
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statute, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-40 (1953), since they first sought 
redress through the Insurance Department of the State of Utah. 
The Crookstons ignore that Utah Code Ann. §78-12-40 applies only 
where an "action is commenced within due time. ..." The type of 
"action" envisioned under that statute does not include the type 
of proceeding initiated by the Crookstons and the Utah State 
Insurance Department. The term "action" should be construed 
narrowly to include only those proceedings in courts of justice or 
quasi judicial bodies in which the rights of the parties may be 
conclusively adjudicated. See Crystal Carline v. State Tax 
Commission, 110 Utah 426, 174 P.2d 984 (1946). While public 
policy may favor alternative dispute resolution, i.e., contacting 
the State Insurance Department with disputes, the provisions of 
the saving statute, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-40 (1953), requires far 
more than merely filing a letter of dispute. 
The Crookstons likewise contend that the provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-44 somehow resurrect their causes of action 
against Fire Insurance. In order to accept that proposition, one 
must first accept that the policy's limitation period is somehow 
superceded by other statutory limitations and exceptions thereto. 
There is no such concession found within the four corners of the 
policy issued by Fire Insurance. The contractual limitation 
period found in the policy preempts any and all other potentially 
applicable limitation periods imposed by statute. 
The contractural limitations found in the subject policy 
applies to and bars all of the Crookstons' claims against Fire 
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Insurance. Such contractual limitations are enforceable. The 
parties' obligations and rights under the policy vested as of 
December 2, 1981. No statutory amendment can impair the parties' 
vested rights and obligations thereafter. The tolling provisions 
relied upon by the Crookstons are wholly inapplicable. The trial 
court committed error in denying Fire Insurance's motion for 
summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Fire Insurance respectfully 
requests that the judgment of the trial court be reversed, and 
that this court direct the trial court to enter a finding that the 
Crookstons' claims against Fire Insurance are barred under the 
provisions of the policy's one-year right to commence action 
provision. In the alternative, Fire Insurance requests that this 
matter be reversed and remanded with directions that a new trial 
be granted. . 
Dated this 2 3 day of / JOVJUSAMM^ , 1988. 
STRONG & HANNI 
Frank A. Roybal 
Attorneys for Fire Insurance 
-27-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the 
delivered this Q$ day of Jl^yJ^^jM^^ , foregoing was hand 
1988, to the following: 
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510 Clark Learning Building 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 




Utah Code Annot. §31-19-19 (1953) (repealed 1986) 
Void conditions, stipulations or agreements,— 
(1) No insurance contract delivered or issued 
for delivery in this state and covering subjects 
located, resident or to be performed in this 
state shall contain any condition, stipulation, 
or agreement 
* * * 
(c) limiting right of action against the 
insurer to a period of less than one year from 
the time when the cause of action accrues in 
connection with all insurances other than prop-
erty and marine and transportation insurance. 
In contracts of property insurance, or of marine 
and transportation insurance such limitation shall 
not be to a period of less than one year from the 
date of the loss. 
(2) Any such condition, stipulation or agree-
ment shall be void, but such voiding shall not 
affect the validity of the other provisions of 
the contract. 
Utah Code Annot. 31A-21-313 (Supp. 1986) 
Limitation of actions, 
(1) An action on a written policy or con-
tract of insurance must be commenced within 
three years after the inception of the loss. 
* * * 
(3) No insurance policy may: 
(a) Limit the time for beginning an 
action on the policy to a time less than 
that authorized by statute; 
A-l 
Utah Code Annot. §78-12-40 (1953) 
Effect of failure of action not on merits. 
If any action is commenced within due time 
and a judgment thereon for the plaintiff is 
reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such 
action or upon a cause of action otherwise than 
upon the merits, and the time limited either by 
law or contract for commencing the same shall 
have expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies and 
the cause of action survives, his representatives, 
may commence a new action within one year after 
the reversal or failure. 
Utah Code Annot. §78-12-44 (1953) 
Effect of payment, acknowledgment, or promise 
to pay. 
In any case founded on contract, when any 
part of the principal or interest shall have 
been paid, or an acknowledgment of an existing 
liability, debt or claim, or any promise to 
pay the same, shall have been made, an action 
may be brought within the period prescribed 
for the same after such payment, acknowledgment 
or promise; but such acknowledgment or promise 
must be in writing, signed by the party to be 
charged thereby. When a right of action is 
barred by the provisions of any statute, it 
shall be unavailable either as a cause of 
action or ground of defense. 
A-2 
A RELATIVE SAMPLING OF UTAH PUNITIVE DAMAGE CASES 
Punitive 
Date Case Award 
1987 Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange $ 4,000,000 
1987 Roberts v. Seven-Up, C-86-0013 Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County 300,0001 
1985 Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985) 500,000 
1985 Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching, 701 P.2d 
1106 (Utah 1985) 200,000 
1985 Atkin, Wright & Miles v. Mountain States 
Telephone, 709 P.2d 330 (Utah 1985) 30,000 
1984 Bundy v. Century Equipment, 692 P.2d 754 
(Utah 1984) 75,000 
1983 Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983) 28,000 
1983 Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723 (Utah 1983) 12,000 
1982 First Security Bank v. JBJ Feedyards, 653 
P.2d 591 (Utah 1982) 100,000 
1982 Leigh Furniture v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 
1982) 35,000 
1982 Branch v. Western Petroleum, 657 P.2d 267 
(Utah 1982) 13,000 
1980 Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37 (Utah 1980) 30,000 
1979 Terry v. Zions Cooperative Merchantile 
Institution, 605 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1979) 15,000 
1975 Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354 (Utah 1975) 10,000 
1975 Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325 (Utah 
1975) 3,000 
1973 Holdaway v. Hall, 29 Utah 2d 77, 505 P.2d 
295 (1973) 10,000 
ijury awarded $10,000,000. Punitive award remitted to $300,000 
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Point IV C 
p. 65 
Citation Subject 
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Fourteenth Amendment 
Company v. Haslip, No. 89-1279, to United States 
(Decided March 4, 1991) 
——— U • o • _____________ , _____________ —* • —* t • 
L.Ed. 2d 
1991 WL 24587 
Constitution does 
not preclude award 
of punitive damages 
in amount more than 
four times the amount 
awarded as compensa-
tory damages. 
Thank you for your attention to this matter. 
Sincerely, 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN Jc POWELL, P.C. 
M. Douglas Bayly 
MDB:cl 
cc: Philip R. Fishier 
Steven J. Trayner 
Frank A. Roybal 
